Author(s)
In Jonathan Bevan v. Ministry of Defence [2025] EWHC 1145 (KB), Mr. Bevan, a soldier, sought damages for alleged negligent exposure to excessive noise during his participation in testing Ajax armoured vehicles with the Household Cavalry Regiment from 2017 to 2020. Although the Defendant conceded a breach of duty, the trial centred on causation. The claim was ultimately dismissed but provides a useful insight into the approach to causation in acoustic shock claims.
At trial the Court heard from Professor Wright, the Claimant’s expert and Mr Parker, the Defendant’s expert.
Central to this case was the alleged injury and the preceding chronology. Mr Bevan suffered psychological damage as a result of the tinnitus in the form of a “conversion disorder” (or functional neurological disorder, FND) which led to non-organic hearing loss. It was agreed that if the tinnitus claim failed on causation, the FND claim would also fall away.
The focus in this case was, accordingly, the Claimant’s tinnitus, which His Honour Judge Bird acknowledged presented causation difficulties for medical practitioners. Tinnitus is a symptom rather than a disease, and it usually arises due to damage (possibly subliminal damage) to the inner ear, which is not capable of testing aside from potentially invasive techniques best undertaken postmortem. In HHJ Bird’s words:
“a significant number of individuals with hearing loss/tinnitus never have an underlying cause diagnosed, even with the very best investigation.”
The second important consideration regarding tinnitus, is the interaction with psychological conditions. Mr. Bevan’s military history and mental health were pivotal to understanding his claims. His service was marked by traumatic experiences, including a challenging deployment in Afghanistan and subsequent psychological struggles, including a diagnosis of PTSD. While deemed credible, Mr. Bevan’s recollections of his symptoms’ onset were inconsistent, complicated by stressors from his military duties and personal circumstances. The symbiotic relationship between his mental state, history of auditory exposure, and conversion disorder claims contributed to the intricate evaluation of his condition, ultimately impacting the case’s outcome.
The experts agreed that “anxiety and depression can enhance an individual’s perception of tinnitus.” This was particularly important in this case with Mr Parker, expressing the view that “tinnitus can be caused (for example) by PTSD ‘regardless of acoustics’.”
Beyond the actual injury itself, the mechanism by which any injury was caused was intrinsic to the issues the Court had to decide. The experts proposed three methods:
1) Classic noise induced hearing loss (NIHL), which relies on the diagnostic criteria set out in a paper by Coles, Lutman and Buffin published in 2000 entitled “Guidelines on the Diagnosis of noise-induced hearing loss for medicolegal purposes”
2) Acoustic trauma, which arises from exposure to very loud noises, involves a different mechanism of damage from that of NIHL.
3) Acoustic shock can arise at much lower (and even non-negligent) levels.
An interesting but not uncommon side note in this case was the evolving nature of the claim. Originally presented as noise-induced hearing loss and then as “non-organic” hearing loss in Prof. Wright’s initial report. At trial, it was accepted that acoustic shock was the only viable mechanism as the experts concurred that neither acoustic trauma nor NIHL applied.
Acoustic shock had, however, only been raised by the Claimant’s expert (or indeed at all) shortly before the pre-trial review following joint statements. It was raised in an “unusual” supplemental report, which didn’t refer to the Claimant and was only discussed by the experts on the first day of trial. Objections to this reformulated case were made by the Defendant in closing but rejected by the Judge as being “too late,” as they ought to have been made at the start of the trial.
In determining whether there was acoustic shock the Court considered the “Grindleford Criteria” espoused by Mr Parker in his 2014 paper and latter updating paper entitled “acoustic shock: an update review” by Mr Parker, V L Parker, G Parker, and A J Parker. This set out the following criteria for a diagnosis of acoustic shock:
These criteria were described as “the best and only guidelines that I have” by HHJ Bird and “no criticism was raised of them by Prof. Wright”. Accordingly, as it presently stands the Grindleford criteria appear likely to be applied by the Courts when considering acoustic shock claims.
As set out above the Court ultimately accepted the evidence of Mr Parker which was described as “compelling” and found that the criteria for acoustic shock were not met.
“Mr Parker’s firm view was that this is not an acoustic shock case. He accepted that G3 was satisfied but was clear that G1, G2 and G4 were not. In short, there was no defined acoustic incident from which ear symptoms commenced straight away or shortly afterwards. Even if there was, the symptoms (bilateral tinnitus) were not experienced in, and do not arise from (because there is no overwhelming tinnitus), the exposed (right) ear.”
It is worthwhile considering the position in respect of G1, G2 and G4 in turn.
The requirement for a defined acoustic event is often an important factual dispute in acoustic shock cases. The author has experience of cases where a general unspecified exposure to noise is alleged. This is insufficient to satisfy G1 which requires “a memorable event. Enough to produce a startle and a shock” according to Mr Parker. The Court’s finding on exposure in respect of which the Defendant had conceded breach of duty was as follows:
“The exposure was regular, and it seems to me from the evidence that it was repetitive and broadly predictable. There were regular loud alarms and regular less intrusive alarms and there was general loud vehicle noise. There was no suggestion of any particular or unusual noise or of any day or days when things were worse than usual. There was no memorable or unusual one-off (or even repeated) acoustic event.”
Whilst this would have supported a classic NIHL claim, the evidence fell short of satisfying G1. Practitioners on both sides should forensically examine whether there was a defined acoustic event where an acoustic shock claim is intimated. In practical terms one would expect evidence of a complaint, a report or communication of the event to nearby colleagues.
Absent a defined acoustic event, it is impossible to satisfy G2 which requires temporal proximity between the event and the onset of symptoms. This requirement inevitably considers what is sufficiently proximate to satisfy the criterion. When challenged on this during the trial Mr Parker accepted:
“the required temporal link between the event and the symptoms need not be immediate and that there might be an onset of tinnitus some considerable time (perhaps two months later) post the event.”
However, with this concession came the caveat from Mr Parker that there would need to be some symptom which arose “straight away or shortly” after the relevant event. It is likely to be an area of challenge and contention in such cases as to what ‘shortly after’ encompasses.
The other feature in this case was the use of a unilateral headset with bilateral symptoms. Mr Parker’s view was that bilateral tinnitus was inconsistent with acoustic shock in only the right ear. It was only where the acoustic shock was “overwhelming” that unilateral exposure could cause bilateral tinnitus. It is therefore important to consider the congruence between exposure and symptomology when considering the strength of any causation arguments.
Finally, the reference to psychological overlay in the Grindleford criteria was explored, given the historic vulnerability of the Claimant in this case. This is important because it is often the case that acoustic shock arises in individuals with a history of psychological symptomology. The view of Mr Parker was that the psychological state of the victim “does not diminish the diagnosis” but will potentially influence the degree of disability.
This case provides further clarity on the diagnosis of acoustic shock following the Court of Appeal decision in Royal Opera House Covent Garden Foundation v Goldscheider [2019] EWCA Civ 711. The Grindleford criteria now appear to be the uniform approach to diagnosis in such cases and should be used as a guide to practitioners on both sides considering how to analyse exposure and causation evidence and the importance of the description of exposure, the onset of symptoms and whether symptoms fit with the exposure.
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