Crazy Horses! Considering the Animals Act and Fundamental Dishonesty Following O’Connell v the MOD

In Debbie O’Connell v The Ministry of Defence [2025] EWHC 2301 (KB)the claimant failed in both negligence and strict liability, and further the claim was found to be fundamentally dishonest.  For the purposes of strict liability pursuant to the Animals Act 1971, on s.2(2)(a) it was found that severe injury was not likely to be sustained.  Both s.2(2)(b) and s.2(2)(c) were made out.  

Facts

The claimant was a gunner in the King’s Troop Royal Horse Artillery and was one of three recruits having a riding lesson.  All three recruits were directed to cross the school and turn right.  Two crossed and turned left, whereas the claimant turned right. Assuming she had done so in error, she turned her horse ‘Jazz’ in order to go in the opposite direction.  In doing so the claimant’s balance was affected. ‘Jazz’ bucked and the claimant was thrown off, sustaining a serious injury to her left shoulder.

The claimant advanced a case that she had recovered orthopaedically but had been left with neuropathic pain, weakness and restriction of movement.  The defendant’s case was that the claimant’s recovery was in fact far better, such that she could use her arm normally or near normally, and that the claim she advanced was fundamentally dishonest.

Why the Case is of Interest to Practitioners

The first point of note is that a sequential approach to section 2(2)(a) of the Act was adopted, that is to say each subsection is to be considered in order of appearance (see judgment at paragraph 52.) This approach was held to be correct in Dennis v Voute & Another [2022] EWHC 2117 (QB) and followed in Boyd v Hughes [2025] EWHC 435 (KB).  It would now appear to be settled, therefore, that the court cannot take into account the characteristic behaviour in question when determining the likelihood of harm arising. I use the word ‘appear’ deliberately, because whilst DHCJ Christopher Kennedy KC expressly endorsed the sequential approach, the first limb of s.2(2)(a) (likelihood of harm) was not in fact in issue; the claimant relied upon the second limb (likelihood of severe harm) only.  In Dennis, the sequential approach was only endorsed in respect of limb one, and not limb two (see judgment at paragraph 44.) DHCJ Christopher Kennedy KC’s endorsement of the sequential approach must surely therefore be obiter.

As to the second limb of s.2(2)(a), it was found that there was no likelihood of severe harm.  In light of the factual matrix of this case (a fall caused by a buck) this will almost certainly come as a surprise to practitioners dealing regularly with Animals Act claims. 

A third point of note is that the approach adopted when considering the likelihood of severe harm was the same as that adopted in Boyd, viz. a case specific one (see judgment at paragraphs 57 and 58.) Here, the learned judge made specific reference to Cotter J’s findings in Boyd that on some facts, a conclusion as to the likelihood of severe harm can be easily reached, but on others, matters are far more complex.

Paragraph 61 of the judgment is of particular note, wherein it was held that the manner in which the claimant landed was not to be taken into account when considering the likelihood of severe harm arising.  The rationale for this decision was that such consideration would be “too proximate to the injury itself.”  The learned judge went on to reiterate a principle first expounded in Lynch v Ed Walker Racing [2017] EWHC 2484 (QB), that the judge determining the question of whether severe harm was likely must put him or herself into the position of a bystander watching the events unfold. He went on to take into account the speed at which the horse was moving, that the claimant was unprepared for the buck, that the buck was neither small nor insubstantial, the height of the horse, the relatively forgiving nature of the surface and that the claimant was wearing protective clothing.  Finally he felt supported in his decision that there was no likelihood of severe harm by evidence of three subsequent recorded instances of falls wherein ’Jazz’ bucked, also in the riding school, also whilst she was trotting, and no severe injury appeared to have been sustained.

Practitioners dealing with claims involving a fall will therefore have to analyse the facts of the case before them keenly, and exclude from such analysis the manner in which the claimant fell, when considering the likely outcome under s.2(2)(a) limb two.

On s.2(2)(b), it was found for the purposes of limb one that ‘Jazz’ had no abnormal propensity to buck.   On limb two, the principle founded in Ford v Seymour Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848 and followed in Boyd was distilled neatly at paragraph 67 “the characteristic must be defined, as must the particular times or circumstances.”   The defendant sought to draw a parallel with Cotter J’s analysis of s.2(2)(b) in Boyd wherein shying/jinking or moving sharply in response to a very wide range of sights or sounds present led to the finding that the claimant had failed to establish characteristic behaviour.   DHCJ Christopher Kennedy KC rejected any parallel and found that bucking was not a general normal characteristic.  He further found that the particular circumstances in which such characteristic behaviour was displayed were those agreed by the equestrian experts, namely a loss of rider balance and lack of control, combined with the two other recruits and horses moving in the opposite direction.

On fundamental dishonesty, the learned judge found “overwhelming” evidence of dishonesty. He found stark differences between what the claimant was captured doing in surveillance footage and the information she provided to the experts and the DWP as to her capabilities.  For example, she was captured driving a manual horsebox.  The learned judge also found that she was responsible for the long term care of more than one horse, and not just the temporary care for which she contended.  He further found that the claimant had falsely included a claim for the purchase of an automatic vehicle. He considered the three questions posed in Muyepa v Ministry of Defence [2022] EWHC 2648 (QB) to be “useful tools” in determining whether that dishonesty was fundamental, namely 1) at what stage and in what circumstances did the dishonesty start? 2) does it taint the whole of the claim or is it limited to a divisible element? and 3) how does the value of the underlying valid claim compare with that of the dishonestly inflated claim?  On the first, it was found that the dishonesty began when the claimant told her orthopaedic expert that she had adapted her vehicle, when she had not.  On the second, it was found that the dishonesty tainted the whole claim since it went to the extent of disability which informed various heads of loss. On the third, whilst no attempt was made at a precise valuation (given that the claim had been dismissed) it was held that the underlying valid claim “may well have been worth more than 50% of the inflated claim” [194].